their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com …Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in …- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement …

criminal opportunities. We focus on local non-rival crime deterrence that is more efficient against criminals pursuing domestic … centralization less desirable. -- crime mobility ; crime deterrence ; decentralization ; strategic delegation ; side payments …

their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com …Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in …- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement …

and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. We assume that crime is mobile, both ex ante (migration …) and ex post (fleeing), and that criminals who hide abroad after having committed a crime in a country must be extradited … sufficiently costly, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country in which they have perpetrated a crime …