In light of the recent debate about the effectiveness, efficiency and remuneration of central banks, we study the specific corporate governance problems of central banks in their complex role of inflation guardians, bankers' banks, financial industry regulators/supervisors and, in some cases,...

Based on a connection between network analysis and B-VAR models, this paper provides a first empirical evidence of the relationships between capital centralization expressed in terms of network control on one hand and monetary policy guidelines and business cycles on the other. Our findings...

We examine whether business groups’ influence on cash holdings depends on ownership. Group affiliation can increase firms’ agency costs or benefit firms by providing an internal capital market, especially in transition economies characterized by weak investor protection and difficult...

Between the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014, a radical reform of Banca d'Italia – the Italian central bank and banking supervisory authority – was enacted. It was the last chapter of a historical evolution, started in 1893 with its incorporation as a joint-stock-corporation under...

We show that passive ownership can reduce agency costs and affect corporate governance using novel data of a central bank’s ETF purchasing program as a source of a cross-sectional variation of passive ownership. The empirical findings document that firms with high passive ownership are more...