This paper investigates the international spillovers of government debt and the associated risk of inflation within a monetary union when countries have different pension systems. I use a stochastic two-country two-period overlapping-generations model, where one country has PAYG pensions and the...

This paper investigates the international spillovers of government debt and the associated risk of inflation within a monetary union when countries have different pension systems. I use a stochastic two-country two-period overlapping-generations model, where one country has PAYG pensions and the...

We construct a staggered-price dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations based on uncertain lifetimes. Price stickiness plus lack of Ricardian Equivalence could be expected to make an increase in government debt, with associated changes in lumpsum taxation, effective in...

This paper studies the relation between money supply and the long-run economic growth in the context of an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations. We present detailed analyses of growth and welfare effects of monetary expansion under alternative money supply rules. It is shown...

We present a two-country New Open Economy Macroeconomics model of a currency union featuring an overlapping generations structure of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) type as well as monopolistic frictions and staggered adjustment in the goods and labor market. We allow for public investment and...

We present an analytically tractable two-country New Open Economy Macroeconomics model of a currency union featuring an overlapping gen- erations structure of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) type. It enables us to study the transmission and spillover effects of a wider range of fiscal shocks...

We consider the properties of two monetary policy rules ("strict inflation targeting", "constant money growth rule") in an intertemporal equilibrium model with flexible prices in which monetary policy is "active", while fiscal policy is "passive". Specifically, we assume that the fiscal agent...