We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents. Time is discrete and horizon finite. Agents are in the market from the first date and, at each date, have to be assigned items (or bundles of items). When the social planner can only elicit...

The efficacy of the widely-adopted “top-n” policy in university integration has been questioned because students strategically relocate to low-achieving high schools. We show that when different SES groups have heterogenous relocation costs, the policy can even segregate minorities from the...

Reserve systems have been designed and implemented for numerous real-world resource allocation problems. Often, de-reservation policies accompany reserve systems to prevent waste in instances of low demand for exclusive reserve categories. De-reservation policies must be executed carefully so...

The optimal control literature traditionally analyzes linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) formulations of macroeconomic policy design where policy planers seek to minimize the distance between a direct target vector y and a vector of aspiration levels y*, using a suitably dimensioned matrix M as a...

We study whether the mechanism design in the central bank liquidity auctions matters for the interbank money market interest rate levels and volatility. Furthermore, we compare different mechanisms to sell liquidity in terms of revenue, efficiency and auction stage interest rate levels and...

We study whether the mechanism design in the central bank liquidity auctions matters for the interbank money market interest rate levels and volatility. Furthermore, we compare different mechanisms to sell liquidity in terms of revenue, efficiency and auction stage interest rate levels and...