In an earlier paper (Blinder and Morgan, 2005), we created an experimental apparatus in which Princeton University students acted as ersatz central bankers, making monetary policy decisions both as individuals and in groups. In this study, we manipulate the size and leadership structure of...

In an earlier paper (Blinder and Morgan, 2005), we created an experimental apparatus in which Princeton University students acted as ersatz central bankers, making monetary policy decisions both as individuals and in groups. In this study, we manipulate the size and leadership structure of...

For politicians, appointments are an instrument of policy influence. By installing their representatives in an institution, politicians can count on policy influence for the duration of their appointees' terms. Given the stakes, the occasional controversy regarding nominees is understandable. On...

This paper examines President Obama's rhetoric concerning financial regulation during 2009-10, during legislative action on financial reform. The study evaluates the use of basic automated textual analysis. This requires addressing a number of unresolved analytical issues. This study offers some...

We assemble a novel dataset on transitions in central bank leadership in several countries, and study how monetary policy is conducted around those events. We find that policy is tighter both at the last meetings of departing governors and first meetings of incoming leaders. This finding cannot...

The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chairman Greenspan influenced the Reserve Bank Presidents. This question is interesting, because it has been argued that their preferences would be more persistent compared to those of the Governors. We estimate individual Taylor-type reaction...