Followers of law, politics and business commonly relate stories of individuals who appear to predict an expected self-performance level below what they believe likely. Candidates, attorneys and firms sometimes seem to under-predict their own capacities. Insofar as individuals typically construct...

We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to fashion equilibrium outcomes in an environment where market participants play a coordination game with heterogeneous information. We consider a simple model of regime change that embeds many applications examined in the literature. In...

We explore the economics and optimal design of "permissioned" distributed ledger technology (DLT) in a credit economy. Designated validators verify transactions and update the ledger at a cost that is derived from a supermajority voting rule, thus giving rise to a public good provision game....

This paper considers an open-loop Nash game between independent monetary and fiscal authorities which seek to achieve conflicting objectives. The monetary authority is concerned solely with achieving a desired rate of inflation. The fiscal authority has multiple objectives defined by specific...

Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) promise many benefits but, if not well designed, they could have undesired consequences, including for monetary policy. Issuing an unremunerated CBDC or a wholesale CBDC does not change the objectives of monetary policy or the operational framework for...

Although it is generally accepted that consumer confidence measures are informative signals about the state of the economy, theoretical macroeconomic models designed for the analysis of monetary policy typically do not provide a role for them. I develop a framework with asymmetric information in...

How forward guidance influences expectations is not yet fully understood. To study this issue, I construct central bank data that includes forward guidance and its attributes, central bank projections, and quantitative easing, which I combine with survey data. I find that, in response to a...

We introduce behavioral learning equilibria (BLE) into a multi-variate linear framework and apply it to New Keynesian DSGE models. In a BLE, boundedly rational agents use simple but optimal first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) forecasting rules whose parameters are consistent with the observed...

Central bank communication plays an important role in shaping market participants' expectations. This paper studies a simple nonlinear model of monetary policy in which agents have incomplete information about the economic environment. It shows that agents' learning and the dynamics of the...