Naor's (1969) celebrated paper studies customer decisions in an observable M/M/1 queue where joining-customers utility is linearly decreasing with the joining position. Naor derives the optimal threshold strategies for the individuals, social planner and monopolist, and proves the monopoly...

Traditional monopoly pricing models assume that firms have full information about the market demand and consumer preferences. In this article, we study a prototypical monopoly pricing problem for a seller with limited market information and different levels of demand learning capability under...

Traditional monopoly pricing models assume that firms have full information about the market demand and consumer preferences. In this paper we study a prototypical monopoly pricing problem for a seller with limited market information and different levels of demand learning capability under...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...