Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off...

Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from fierce competition in thick labour markets. We first establish that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. Local differences in wage-setting power predict...

Die neue Weiterbildungsliteratur zeigt auf, dass Arbeitgeber in monopsonistisch geprägten Märkten bereit sind, nicht nur die Kosten für firmenspezifische, sondern auch für allgemeine Weiterbildung zu tragen, wenn das Risiko, dass Mitarbeiter abgeworben werden, gering ist. Dies bedeutet, dass...

The new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm-specific training but also for general training if the risk of poaching is limited. This implies that training participation should decrease when competition for employees is higher among...

We analyze the price pass-through effect of the minimum wage and use the results to provide insight into the competitive structure of low-wage labor markets. Using monthly price series, we find that the pass-through effect is entirely concentrated on the month that the minimum wage change goes...

This paper investigates the degree of monoposony power of German employers in different industries, using a semi-structural approach based on a dynamic model of monopsonistic competition. The empirical analysis is based on a linked employer-employee data set which allows us to control for...