This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is launching a web-based platform. The entrepreneur, on one hand, faces a large degree of demand uncertainty on his product and on the other hand has to deal with incentive problems of professional blockchain participants who...

This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is launching a web-based platform. The entrepreneur, on one hand, faces a large degree of demand uncertainty onhis product and on the other hand has to deal with incentive problems of professional blockchainparticipants who...

This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is considering launching a web-based platform. Our model is the first one that analyzes an entrepreneur's choice between security tokens (via a security token offering (STO)) and utility tokens (via initial coin offering...

We consider a principal-agent relationship, where the agent is subject to a double moral hazardproblem (the choice of production effort and earnings manipulation). Since the agent cannot completely capture the results of his effort, the production effort is socially inefficient. The opportunity...