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Insurance and information : firms as a commitment device
Bovenberg, Ary Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001
and the firm can base its incentive payments on good information. Competition, however, may allow themarket and explicit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894
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Employee referral, social proximity and worker discipline : theory and evidence from India
Dhillon, Amrita; Iversen, Vegard; Torsvik, Gaute - 2013
We study an important mechanism underlying employee referrals into informal low skilled jobs in developing countries. Employers can exploit social preferences between employee referees and potential workers to improve discipline. The profitability of using referrals increases with referee stakes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765001
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Employee Referral, Social Proximity and Worker Discipline : Theory and Evidence from India
Dhillon, Amrita; Iversen, Vegard; Torsvik, Gaute - 2021
We study an important mechanism underlying employee referrals into informal low skilled jobs in developing countries. Employers can exploit social preferences between employee referees and potential workers to improve discipline. The profitability of using referrals increases with referee stakes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315747
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Norms, incentives and information in income insurance
Lindbeck, Assar; Persson, Mats - 2015
insured individuals. Thus, the functioning of social norms depends crucially on information, in particular on what norm … enforcers are able to observe about an insured individual's behavior. Information is also decisive when distinguishing between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482983
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Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard
Houben, Eike - 2002 - First Version: March 2002, this Version: December 2002
revealed about his private information regarding the project's perspectives. This property can be used to induce both players … to reveal their private information truthfully and to spend the efficient effort. This result holds irrespective of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011281511
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Subjective evaluation versus public information
Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort … and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336
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Delegating recruitment under asymmetric information
Sengupta, Sarbajit - 2002
seniors will not deliberately choose bad candidates if the only information asymmetry between the owner and the recruiter … information asymmetry between the owner and the senior employee regarding additional aspects of firm operations, however, moral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514022
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A Location Model of a Firm's Organizational Mode Under Moral Hazard
Andal, Emmanuel Genesis T. - 2017
. Given that the firm chooses to outsource, incomplete contracting arises because of asymmetric information. This paper uses a … principal-agent model to analyze the notion of asymmetric information, specifically moral hazard. In this model, the principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952667
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Optimal Task Scheduling under Moral Hazard & Adverse Selection
Agastya, Murali - 2019
A Principal owns a project consisting of several tasks. Tasks differ, both in their innate success probabilities and their incremental benefits. Moreover, specialists must be engaged to perform these tasks. Subject to moral hazard and adverse selection, in what order should the Principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859420
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Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness
Iossa, Elisabetta - 2014
providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the … (supervisor) has private information on contracting costs and chooses the degree of contractual incompleteness on behalf of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050659