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Adverse selection in dynamic moral hazard

Ma, Ching-to Albert - In: The quarterly journal of economics 106 (1991) 1, pp. 255-275

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001100434

Moral hazard, insurance and some collusion: A comment on Alger and Ma

Niemann, Maike; Schiller, Jörg - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 60 (2006) 2, pp. 276-277

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003314617

Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion

Alger, Ingela; Ma, Ching-to Albert - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 50 (2003) 2, pp. 225-247

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001720484

Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion

Alger, Ingela; Ma, Ching-to Albert - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001375794

Health insurance, moral hazard, and managed care

Ma, Ching-to Albert; Riordan, Michael H. - In: Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS 11 (2002) 1, pp. 81-107

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001650141

Uterus at a price : disability insurance and hysterectomy

Fan, Elliott; Lien, Hsienming; Ma, Ching-to Albert - In: Journal of health economics 66 (2019), pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012224635

Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion

Brundin, Ingela; Ma, Ching-to Albert - 1998

A risk-averse consumer purchases an insurance policy; if she suffers a loss, she may receive services from a provider to recover some of the loss. Only the consumer and the provider know if the loss has actually occurred. The provider's behavior is uncertain. With some positive probability, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209329