Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 7,209
Cover Image
Rotten kids with bad intentions
Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - 2010
player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315514
Cover Image
Rotten kids with bad intentions
Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - 2010 - Rev. version January 2010
player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity … concerns, the materialistic player ends up with a negligible share of the gains from trade. -- Reciprocity ; Psychological …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008695432
Cover Image
Peer effects and incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2014
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430294
Cover Image
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
Cover Image
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2009
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011634988
Cover Image
Moral hazard : base models and two extensions
Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, J. David - 2016
We analyze the optimal contract in static moral hazard situations, where the agent’s effort is not verifiable. We first present the main trade-offs of the principal-agent model. We cover the trade-off of incentives (motivation) vs. risk-sharing (efficiency), incentives vs. rents (when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451122
Cover Image
What renders financial advisors less treacherous? : on commissions and reciprocity
Angelova, Vera - 2010
. -- financial advisors ; moral hazard ; reciprocity ; experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980494
Cover Image
Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
Cover Image
Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
Cover Image
Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706