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This paper studies team design in the context of a standard risk-neutral principal-agent model with contractual constraints. I introduce heterogeneity in agents' technologies in terms of how agents shift probability mass across states of nature when they exert effort. Moral hazard and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832543
based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical … cross-authority delegation is the optimal form of full delegation. If, however, the division heads are more efficient than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748623
based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. The analysis includes the owner of a firm, a … delegation of authority to them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on private benefits of control. In that …, but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is optimal for cooperation being crucial. If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198507
We address the question of how the internal organization of partnerships can be affected by moral hazard behavior of their division(s)/agent(s). We explore cases where two entregreneurs, each employing one agent subject ot moral hazard, decide how to conduct a research project together. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366567
This Article analyzes how, and when, corporate governance could be improved by utilizing "relational investing." The term relational investing is just coming into vogue and there does not yet seem to be a consensus on what it means. Although the term has been trumpeted on the cover of Business...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988770
This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal / agent model by a … project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority … consideration of e ort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299113
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422133
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011512
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003114944