Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003294932
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261169
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002756345
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011627969
We investigate moral-hazard problems with limited liability where agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences. We show that stochastic compensation for low performance can be optimal. Because of loss aversion, the agents have first-order risk aversion to wage uncertainty. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010902090
We build a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with moral hazard contracting to examine the interactions among skill-biased technological change (SBTC), organizational changes, and skill premium and within-group wage inequality. While the existing literature finds that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653992
Abstract This paper studies the optimal organizational form and the optimal type of manager by considering the nonmaterial (psychological) payoff as well as the standard material payoff for agents. I compare two organizational forms: T-form, where all agents have the same job title so that they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011911
This paper develops a simple growth model with moral hazard contracting to examine the interactions between the organizational mode of firms and economic productivity growth. The organizational mode of firms differs in terms of the degree to which decisions of R&D investment are delegated to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008680900
This paper examines a multi-agent moral hazard model in which agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences `a la K˝oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The agents’ utilities depend not only on their realized outcomes but also on the comparisons of their realized outcomes with their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009019563