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This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...
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Using a model based on a tradeoff between moral hazard incentives and gains from specialization, this paper explains why farming has generally not converted from small, family-based firms into large, factory-style corporate firms. Nature is both seasonal and random, and the interplay of these...
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This article surveys the literature on principal-agent problems with moral hazard that gained popularity following the seminal works of Mirrlees (1976), Holmström (1979), and others. This literature is concerned with designing incentives to motivate one or more workers—typically by paying for...
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This paper studies relational incentive contracts with persistent states in the presence of both moral hazard and information asymmetry. The optimal contracts are dynamic in which the agents are rewarded following a high output by moving to a higher continuation payoff in the next period. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849872
A common means of incorporating non-verifiable performance measures in compensation contracts is via bonus pools. We study a principal-multi-agent relational contracting model in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852752
This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether the first-order approach (FOA) is valid or not, the optimal bonus scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899481