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Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious
Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - 2003
incentives through groupversus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, eitherscheme may be the least …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844237
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Strategy Meets Evolution: Games Suppliers and Producers Play
Guha, Brishti - School of Economics, Singapore Management University - 2006
Final goods producers, who may be intrinsically honest (a behavioral type) or opportunistic (strategic), play a repeated game of imperfect information with suppliers of an input of variable (and non-verifiable) quality. Returns to cheating are increasing in the proportion of intrinsically honest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056810
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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877
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Favoritism Under Social Pressure
Garicano, Luis; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio; Prendergast, … - 2001
This paper provides empirical evidence of favoritism by agents, where that favoritism is generated by social pressure. To do so, we explore the behavior of professional soccer referees. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game (called injury time), to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014128582
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When Should Labor Contracts Be Nominal?
Martin, Antoine; Monnet, Cyril - 2002
We propose a theory to explain the choice between nominal and indexed labor contracts. We find that contracts should be indexed if prices are difficult to forecast and nominal otherwise. Our analysis is based on a principal-agent model developed by Jovanovic and Ueda (1997) in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122274
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Equilibrium Contingent Fees with Heterogeneous Attorneys
Santore, Rudy - 2005
This paper provides a signaling model to analyze the equilibrium fee structures arising when attorneys are heterogeneous with regard to unobservable ability. Unlike fixed fees, contingent fees are more profitable to attorneys who have a greater probability of winning, and thus may serve as an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063158
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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185
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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002048152
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Optimal Incentive Contracts for a Worker Who Envies His Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2021
A worker's utility may increase with his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profit-sharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318976
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Optimal Incentive Contracts When Workers Envy Their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profit-sharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029345