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Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endugenous occupational choice
Ghatak, Maithreesh - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000963160
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Occupational choice and dynamic incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - In: The review of economic studies 68 (2001) 4, pp. 781-810
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001627794
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The not-so-secret agent : professional monitors, hierachies and implementation
Baliga, Sandeep - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000935436
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The emergence and persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German financial systems
Baliga, Sandeep; Polak, Ben - In: The review of financial studies 17 (2004) 1, pp. 129-163
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001907128
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Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - 2001
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135339
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Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - 2001
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147066