We analyse pricing, e¤ort and tipping decisions in the online service GoogleAnswers. While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, theycan additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post.In line with the related experimental literature we …nd evidence that tippingis...

We analyse pricing, effort and tipping decisions in the online service "Google Answers". While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. In line with the related experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is...

This paper focuses on a particular type of strategic manipulation observed in Japanese daycare allocations. Some parents intentionally apply to a highly demanded daycare and are rejected, because a certificate indicating that they were rejected is required to extend the parental leave period....

Government mandated technology transfers from the developer of a product to a second source offer a potential gain of reduced information rents and procurement costs. To provide appropriate incentives, technology must sometimes be transferred even when the second source is less efficient than...

I study a model of blockholder short-termism, where each blockholder (e.g., activist shareholder) has a stake in a different firm and can sell before the impact of his actions on firm value is realized. I find that the existence of value-destroying blockholders can increase average firm value,...

We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's preferred...

In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a...

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...