Many businesses purchase Employment Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI), a form of insurance that protects them from claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination. But critics of EPLI argue that allowing insurance coverage for employment liability detracts from...

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more eort by the agent raises thelikelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase eort inthis case? I nd that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income eect.Overall, bonuses paid for success may well reduce...

We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agencyproblems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agents effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving...

We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework whereparties are risk-neutral and the agent is ¯nancially constrained. Weshow that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining poweris analyzed in either of the following three frameworks; a standard P-Aframework by varying...

We consider the effects on reward systems of workers concern withrelative pay by comparing the wage costs of providing incentives through groupversus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, eitherscheme may be the least cost one depending on the workers outside...

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly.

Public reputation mechanisms are an effective means to limit opportunistic behavior in markets suffering from moral hazard problems. While previous research was mostly concerned with the influence of exogenous feedback mechanisms, this study considers the endogenous emergence of reputation...

We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agency problems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agent's effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving...

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors....

Career concerns can mitigate moral hazard problems, but these diminish as the agent's retirement age approaches. Addressing this problem, this note draws attention to the role of the interaction between contractible and non-contractible signals.