This essay surveys the body of research that asks how the efficiency of corporate investment is influenced by problems of asymmetric information and agency. I organize the material around two basic questions. First, does the external capital market channel the right amount of money to each firm?...

We consider a public firm characterized by a moral hazard problem. A distinguished player is a CEO or activist shareholder who (i) is unrestricted to trade shares and (ii) has discretion to increase the value of this firm by exerting costly effort. von Lilienfeld-Toal and Rünzi (J Finance...

Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliatedfirms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions ofmissing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate thisby setting up a model where firms within the business group are connectedto...

This study examines the financial consequences of the moral hazard of the controlling shareholder. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies during the 2003–2009 period, we find that companies characterized by a wider divergence between the controlling shareholder's control and cash flow...

This paper examines the choice of tools for managing a firm’s operational risks: cash reserves, insurance contracts, and financial assets under an optimal financing contract that solves moral hazard between insiders and outside investors. Risk management is valuable as it reduces the costs of...

This paper examines the choice of tools for managing a firm’s operational risks: cash reserves, insurance contracts, and financial assets under an optimal financing contract that solves moral hazard between insiders and outside investors. Risk management is valuable as it reduces the costs of...