Showing 1 - 8 of 8
This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257239
This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010258417
This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068419
This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055384
This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058965
This paper explores implications of nominal rigidity characterized by a non-constanthazard function for aggregate dynamics. I derive the NKPC under an arbitrary hazardfunction and parameterize it with the Weibull duration model. The resulting Phillips curveinvolves lagged inflation and lagged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008939774
We use a static framework characterized by both moral hazard and holdup problems. In the model the optimal allocation of bargaining power balances these frictions. We examine the impact of improved monitoring on that optimal allocation and its impact upon effort, investment, profits and rents....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858082
We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets, studyinga credit market where the qualities of investment projects are notobservable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005854968