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Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - 2009
left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems. -- Unemployment insurance ; retirement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003825176
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Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 5, pp. 509-519
for a job. This is because of the short time-horizon of workers close to retirement. We propose to introduce a pension tax … pension tax allows those workers near retirement who still do not exercise job search to smooth their consumption during their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577642
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Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - In: Journal of public economics 96 (2012) 5/6, pp. 509-519
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702530
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Unemployment, crime and social insurance
Long, Iain W.; Polito, Vito - 2014 - This Draft: July 2014
We study an individual's incentive to search for a job in the presence of random criminal opportunities. These opportunities extenuate moral hazard, as the individual sometimes commits crime rather than searching. Even when he searches, he applies less effort. We then revisit the design of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380952
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An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2002 - First draft: April 2002, This version: December 2002
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519045
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An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2021
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320121
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An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750442
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Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring
Setty, Ofer - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 10 (2019) 2, pp. 693-733
I model job-search monitoring in the optimal unemployment insurance framework, in which job-search effort is the worker’s private information. In the model, monitoring provides costly information upon which the government conditions unemployment benefits. Using a simple one-period model with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012042453
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Moral-hazard-free first-best unemployment insurance
Parsons, Donald O. - 2016
an open question. The rich empirical literature on the "retirement consumption paradox" suggests that the rate is below …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455570
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Ein Instrument zur Eindämmung von Moral Hazard in der Arbeitslosenversicherung ist die finanzielle Sanktion in Form …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245