provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But … trust contracts that pay a generous wage upfront are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …

types, we find that the optimal contract may be very simple, paying the supervisor a flat wage independent of his type and … his evaluation of the agent's effort. Such a contract induces the neutral type of supervisor to report the agent … performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of an optimal contract under informational asymmetries …

hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …

unenforcable bonus contract or to combine the bonus contract with a fine if the agent's effort falls below a minimum standard. We … show that most principals do not use the fine and that the pure bonus contract is more efficient than the combined contract …. Our experiment suggests that principals who are less fair are more likely to choose a combined contract and less likely to …

hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …

contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become … this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts, even preferring a pure bonus contract over a contract that combines the … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit …

either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate … efforts on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the …

hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort …

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker … individual bonus pay. -- Reciprocity ; social exchange ; incentive contracts ; double moral hazard ; GSOEP …