The theory of agency, which has seen many recent applications in the social sciences and management literatures, is essentially a theory of failures: It seeks to understand the problems created when one party attempts to control another's behavior, given that control is costly and it often does...

In a multi-agent contracting setting, agents' performances are related due to both correlating noise and effort spillover. We study the optimal linear contract in which the agents are risk averse. Putting compensation weights on peers' performances helps to filter out common noise, which relaxes...

In this paper we compare the welfare effects of unemployment insurance (UI) with an universal basic income (UBI) system in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks to employment. Both policies provide a safety net in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. While the unemployment insurance program should...

We describe a new mechanism that induces accurate forecasts within an organization while reducing moral hazards and the stigma associated with negative opinions. It is based on the notion of identity escrow, whereby the identity of a forecaster is kept anonymous and only revealed when a number...

This paper discusses the use of informal channels in hiring processes in terms of a standard principal-agent model. We have developed an adverse selection model of the labor market where effort is not contractible and employers have the opportunity to use their group of friends to hire workers....

The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often placeemployees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second,demotions are extremely rare...

We analyse pricing, e¤ort and tipping decisions in the online service GoogleAnswers. While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, theycan additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post.In line with the related experimental literature we …nd evidence that tippingis...

We consider guilt averse agents and principals and study the effects ofguilt on optimal behavior of the principal and the agent in a moral hazardmodel.The principal’s contract proposal contains a target effort in addition tothe monetary incentive scheme. By accepting the agreement, the...

This article analyses the optimal punishment structure set by a regulator in banking markets under asymmetric information. Relying on a theoretical model, we analyse whether a decreasing, constant, or increasing sanction scheme deters potentially repeated offences in banking. We find that an...

The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the...