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Disciplining Delegated Monitors : When Venture Capitalists Fail to Prevent Fraud by Their IPO Firms

Tian, Xuan - 2015

Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038213

Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard and Default Risk

Fu, Shiming - 2019

We study a dynamic moral hazard setting where the manager has private ev- idence that predicts the firm's cash flows. When performance is low, bad news disclosure is rewarded by a lower borrowing cost relative to the no-evidence case. In contrast, no disclosure is associated with higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900045

Efficient Moral Hazard

Gifford, Sharon - 2001

This paper presents an infinite-horizon, discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent's effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals. An agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195604

Rent-Seeking and Criminal Politicians : Evidence from Mining Booms

Asher, Sam - 2019

We study how natural resource rents affect the selection and behavior of holders of public office. Using global price shocks to thirty-one minerals and nationwide geological and political data from India, we show that local mineral rent shocks cause the election of criminal politicians. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903106

Testing Political Agency Models

Pettersson-Lidbom, Per - 2007

This paper tests for political agency effects, that is, whether governments that were ex post re-elected performed better than those who were replaced, and whether re-elected governments performed better than newly elected ones. As a testing ground, I use Swedish local governments which offer a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014050374

Yardstick Competition and Political Agency Problems

Belleflamme, Paul; Hindriks, Jean - 2003

This paper analyzes the role of yardstick competition for improving political decisions. We examine how performance comparisons across jurisdictions affect the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We study two forms of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014124025

Electoral Contests with Dynamic Campaign Contributions

Mattozzi, Andrea - 2017

We study a two-period dynamic principal agent model in which two agents with different unobservable abilities compete in a contest for a single prize. A risk-neutral principal can affect the outcome of the contest by dividing a given budget between agents in each period and her net payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950346

Preventive Repression : Two Types of Moral Hazard

Dragu, Tiberiu - 2017

(security agencies) can exert political influence to increase their payoff by decreasing the ruler's payoff, and "corruption … problem available is politics rather than when the agent can choose between politics and corruption. We also show that the … lead to our central conclusion that opportunities for corruption undermine authoritarian regimes by distorting the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950852

Tax Competition and Political Agency Problems

Kasamatsu, Satoshi - 2019

, under tax competition, populism can improve welfare in terms of either the populist country or the whole world, whereas that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899544

On the non-contractual nature of donor-recipient interaction in development assistance

Murshed, Syed Mansoob (contributor) - 2008

This paper analyses three issues in strategic donor-recipient interaction motivated by the complexity of the rationale underlying aid. The first is when we have several principals with conflicting objectives. Any one principal cannot offer high powered incentives to the agent to carry out their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793485