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Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038213
This paper presents an infinite-horizon, discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent's effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals. An agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195604
We study a dynamic moral hazard setting where the manager has private ev- idence that predicts the firm's cash flows. When performance is low, bad news disclosure is rewarded by a lower borrowing cost relative to the no-evidence case. In contrast, no disclosure is associated with higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900045
We study how natural resource rents affect the selection and behavior of holders of public office. Using global price shocks to thirty-one minerals and nationwide geological and political data from India, we show that local mineral rent shocks cause the election of criminal politicians. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903106
, under tax competition, populism can improve welfare in terms of either the populist country or the whole world, whereas that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899544
The paper argues that financial deregulation incentivized financial firms to take excessive risks and over-expand because it turned social insurance against systemic risk into a common pool (or open) resource. The increased size and complexity of deregulated financial markets in turn raised the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011959972
This paper analyses three issues in strategic donor-recipient interaction motivated by the complexity of the rationale underlying aid. The first is when we have several principals with conflicting objectives. Any one principal cannot offer high powered incentives to the agent to carry out their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793485
(security agencies) can exert political influence to increase their payoff by decreasing the ruler's payoff, and "corruption … problem available is politics rather than when the agent can choose between politics and corruption. We also show that the … lead to our central conclusion that opportunities for corruption undermine authoritarian regimes by distorting the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950852
This paper tests for political agency effects, that is, whether governments that were ex post re-elected performed better than those who were replaced, and whether re-elected governments performed better than newly elected ones. As a testing ground, I use Swedish local governments which offer a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014050374
as government regulation and bureaucratic behavior (and corruption), interest groups and corporate political action …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207256