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Contract theory in the spotlight : Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize winners
Fleckinger, Pierre; Martimort, David - In: Revue d'économie politique 128 (2018) 4, pp. 493-533
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943020
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Unawareness and contracts
Zhao, Xiaojian - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003966561
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Nitpicky insurers and the law of contracts
Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre M. - 2017
that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the … costlessly observable, then it should be included in the contract to improve the risk sharing-incentive trade-off under moral … resulting incompleteness of the contract opens the door to controversies and disputes that may lead to judicial procedures. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723471
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Contracts, incentives and organizations : Hart and Holmström Nobel Laureates
Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew - In: Review of political economy 29 (2017) 4, pp. 493-522
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011882413
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How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance
Wynant, Luc; Manigart, Sophie; Collewaert, Veroniek - In: Venture capital : an international journal of … 25 (2023) 2, pp. 135-160
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299460
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Relational contracts and competitive screening
Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003886122
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A simple impossibility result in behavioral contract theory
Immordino, Giovanni; Menichini, Anna Maria; Romano, … - In: Economics letters 113 (2011) 3, pp. 307-309
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009503020
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Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105
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Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
Malcomson, James M. - 2015 - This version: July 24, 2015
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994
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Relational incentive contracts with private information
Malcomson, James M. - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733160