We use a principal-agent framework to reexamine the implications of the negligence and strict liability rules when the tortfeasor is an agency. (...)

We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agencyproblems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agents effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving...

We consider the effects on reward systems of workers concern withrelative pay by comparing the wage costs of providing incentives through groupversus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, eitherscheme may be the least cost one depending on the workers outside...

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly.

We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...