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A Pareto-metaheuristic for a bi-objective winner determination problem in a combinatorial reverse auction

Buer, Tobias; Kopfer, Herbert - In: Computers & operations research : and their … 41 (2014), pp. 208-220

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222691

Modelling and solving of multidimensional auctions

Fiala, Petr - In: Ekonomický časopis : časopis pre ekonomickú … 65 (2017) 3, pp. 220-236

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012151762

Optimal Multi-Object Auctions

Armstrong, Mark - 2001

their valuations for each object, in which case the optimal auction is efficient. The optimal auction takes one of two … probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other. The format of the optimal auction may depend upon … the number of bidders. In the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed, and the optimal auction is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014148865

A practical multi-objective auction design and optimization framework for sponsored search

Li, Qian; Wang, Liang; Xia, Lirong; Zheng, Wenxun; … - In: Operations research letters 51 (2023) 6, pp. 541-547

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014465719

A logarithmic goal programming approach to develop the utility function for a railway travel

Dutta, Goutam; Ghosh, Priyanko; Kaul, Arushi Wanchoo - In: International journal of revenue management : IJRM 8 (2014/2015) 2, pp. 153-164

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431042

Utility function for airline travel in Nepal and its comparison with India

Natesan, Sumeetha; Singh, Chhaya; Dutta, Goutam - In: International journal of revenue management : IJRM 11 (2019) 1/2, pp. 23-45

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012252074

Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Mechanism Design : Ex-Post Revenue Maximization With Non-Quasilinear Preferences

Kazumura, Tomoya - 2020

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents, who can buy at most one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pairs need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854303

Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation : Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage

Kazumura, Tomoya - 2017

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her (allocation) rule, which she terms desirable: (1)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944677

Fuzzy multi-objective programming problem for revenue management in food industry

Gupta, Neha; Sharma, J. K. - In: Journal of revenue and pricing management 19 (2020) 5, pp. 349-354

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012297968

Multi-criteria decision making in dynamic slotting for attended home deliveries

Lang, Magdalena A. K.; Cleophas, Catherine; Ehmke, Jan … - In: Omega : the international journal of management science 102 (2021), pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012514452