Wie sollen die Regeln für Entscheidungsprozesse gestaltet werden und wie sollen Institutionen aussehen? Diese Arbeit trägt zur Beantwortung dieser übergeordneten Frage bei, in dem sie auf kommunaler Ebene ökonomische, fiskalische und politische Effekte von Institutionen mit empirischen...

Abstract AbstractWie sollen die Regeln für Entscheidungsprozesse gestaltet werden und wie sollen Institutionen aussehen? Diese Arbeit trägt zur Beantwortung dieser übergeordneten Frage bei, in dem sie auf kommunaler Ebene ökonomische, fiskalische und politische Effekte von Institutionen mit...

Through an intertemporal budget constraint, jurisdictions may gain advantages in tax and spending competition by 'competing' on debt. While the existing spatial econometric literature focuses on tax and spending competition, very little is known about spatial interaction via public debt. This...

Through an intertemporal budget constraint, jurisdictions may gain advantages in tax and spending competition by 'competing' on debt. While the existing spatial econometric literature focuses on tax and spending competition, very little is known about spatial interaction via public debt. This...

Through an intertemporal budget constraint, jurisdictions may gain advantages in tax and spending competition by 'competing' on debt. While the existing spatial econometric literature focuses on tax and spending competition, very little is known about spatial interaction via public debt. This...

Through an intertemporal budget constraint, jurisdictions may gain advantages in tax and spending competition by 'competing' on debt. While the existing spatial econometric literature focuses on tax and spending competition, very little is known about spatial interaction via public debt. This...