Showing 1 - 10 of 22
Herings et al. (2008) proposed a solution concept called the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. We provide a characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. The characteration underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of agents,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092914
Abstract: We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, for the class of transferable utility games with limited communication structure represented by a directed graph. The solution is the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090488
AMS classification: 90B18; 91A12; 91A43;
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090586
We study transferable utility games with limited cooperation between the agents. The focus is on communication structures where the set of agents forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph. Agents are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090938
Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 91A12, 91A43
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091131
On the class of cycle-free directed graph games with transferable utility solution concepts, called web values, are introduced axiomatically, each one with respect to some specific choice of a management team of the graph. We provide their explicit formula representation and simple recursive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091203
Abstract: A new solution is presented for transferable utility games with graph communication where the cooperation possibilities are represented by a graph. Players are only able to cooperate and obtain some worth in a coalition if they form a connected set in the given graph. To determine the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091726
For an arbitrary set system we show that there exists a unique minimal building set containing the set system. As solutions we take the solutions for this building covering by extending in a natural way the characteristic function to it.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091838
We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition structure. The theory is based on the notion of nested sets and the complex of nested sets associated to an arbitrary set system and the M-extension of a game for this set. For a set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092044
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph, i.e. they can communicate with one another. We introduce a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325416