Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 3,755
Cover Image
Nash codes for noisy channels
Hernández, Penélope; Stengel, Bernhard von - In: Operations research 62 (2014) 6, pp. 1221-1235
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010471871
Cover Image
On modeling cheap talk in Bayesian games
Matthews, Steven A.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000841590
Cover Image
Focal points in pre-game communication
Rabin, Matthew - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000821773
Cover Image
Problems with coordination in two-player games : comment on "Computational complexity and communication"
Teague, Vanessa - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 76 (2008) 6, pp. 1559-1564
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003797081
Cover Image
The communication complexity of uncoupled Nash equilibrium proceudres
Hart, Sergiu; Mansour, Yishay - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003425960
Cover Image
Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
Gerardi, Dino (contributor); Myerson, Roger B. (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003468426
Cover Image
Meaningful talk
Streb, Jorge M.; Torrens, Gustavo - 2011
In economics, the standard approach to language is that talk is cheap. Here, instead, language is a social convention that affects utility. Unless language is used in its ordinary sense, it cannot help to coordinate actions because there is no way of decoding it. This points to a unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008903436
Cover Image
Non-uniqueness of equilibria in one-shot games of strategic communication
Valsecchi, Irene - 2009
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810295
Cover Image
Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
Jamison, Julian C. - 2012 - This version: January 11, 2012
Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a … communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511713
Cover Image
Believing when credible : talking about future plans and past actions
Vida, Péter - 2015
whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781