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The mean voter theorem : necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium

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A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina

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The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria

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The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria

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Chapter 60 Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis

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The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is an extension of the standard model of Nash equilibrium which allows for errors in choice. The QRE can be viewed as a generalization of statistical models of discrete choice behavior of individuals to a game theoretic setting. Just like in discrete choice...

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