Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of...

We demonstrate that in simple 2 X 2 games (cumulative) prospect theorypreferences can be evolutionarily stable, i.e. a population of players withprospect theory preferences can not be invaded by more rational players. Thisholds also if probability weighting is applied to the probabilities of...

The Classical Cournot Model -- Concave Oligopolies -- General Oligopolies -- Modified and Extended Oligopolies -- Oligopolies with Misspecified and Uncertain Price Functions, and Learning -- Overview and Directions for Future Research

This paper focuses on the link between the group co-operation and the unilateral commitment behaviour of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. As we consider that this last behaviour occurs when bargaining failed, we call it a precautious commitment. We also show that...