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We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in...
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We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855848
We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215916
In Ellsberg paradox, decision makers that are partially informed about the actual probability distribution violate the expected utility paradigm. This paper develops a theory of decision making with a partially specified probability. The paper takes an axiomatic approach using Anscombe-Aumann's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058551