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This paper presents a theoretical model of noisy introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The equilibrium determines layers of beliefs about others' beliefs about ..., etc., but allows for surprises by relaxing the equilibrium requirement that belief distributions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802011
Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317676
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP … theory, although the frequency of Dumb is substantially greater than zero in the unstable treatments. -- Games ; experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921539
Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539831
We run a laboratory experiment with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes in this game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962034
We study learning in finitely repeated 2x2 normal form games, when players have incomplete information about their opponents' payoffs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate whether players (a) learn the game they are playing, (b) learn to predict the behavior of their opponent, and (c) learn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066426
Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968419
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous …-play property. As an extension, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential …, which entails a generalization of Robinson's theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571263
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous … functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each … zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, conflict networks, and decentralized wireless channel selection. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018918
In many experiments, the Nash equilibrium concept seems not to predict well. One reason may be that players have non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011644480