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The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

Baliga, Sandeep; Corchón, Luis C.; Sjöström, Tomas - 1995 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000150895

Arms races and negotiations

Baliga, Sandeep; Sjöström, Tomas - In: The review of economic studies 71 (2004) 2, pp. 351-369

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001988962

Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk

Baliga, Sandeep; Morris, Stephen - In: Journal of economic theory 105 (2002) 2, pp. 450-468

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001697310

Mechanism design for the environment

Baliga, Sandeep; Maskin, Eric - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001764507

The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

Baliga, Sandeep; Corchón, Luis C.; Sjöström, Tomas - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000907874

The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

Baliga, Sandeep - In: Journal of economic theory 77 (1997) 1, pp. 15-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001231587

The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

Baliga, Sandeep; Corchón, Luis C.; Sjöström, Tomas - 1995 - 1. ed

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000911039

Arms Races and Negotiations

Baliga, Sandeep; Sjöström, Tomas - 2002

We consider an "arms race" game, where two players simultaneously decide whether or not to aquire new weapons. Each player has a type, which is his private information. Types are independent. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033346