The paper examines the behaviour of ?evolutionary? models with epsilon-noise like those which have been used recently to discuss the evolution of social conventions. The paper is built around two main observations: that the?long run stochastic stability? of a convention is related to the speed...

The paper provides a general analysis of the types of models with e-perturbations which have been used recently to discuss the evolution of social conventions. Two new measures of the size and structure of the basins of attraction of dynamic systems, the radius and coradius, are introduced in...

We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to decide when and how to change their play. When agents only observe the aggregate distribution of payoffs and only recall information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash...

"The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that...