This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. The English auction is a tatonnement process and lasts multiple rounds. It is modeled as a sequence of round games. Each round game is a normal form game in which an agent's strategies are his...

A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of eight or more ad positions on a page. If a simplified...

Symmetric Nash equilibrium is a well-known refinement of Nash equilibrium in the study of bidding behavior of online advertisers on the sponsored search advertising marketplace. This solution concept, however, has major limitations. It allows for over-bidding and has uncompelling upper bounds....

The generalized second-price (GSP) mechanism is the most widely-used auction format in sponsored search markets. However, figuring out how to bid on GSP auctions presents major theoretical and computational challenges due to the complex nature of the auction format and the infinite number of...

The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms-large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a...

This paper shows that a Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient transition path is selected by households even without frictions as a result of the revealed government failure in supervision of financial markets. The Pareto inefficiency causes the generation of...

Статья посвящена некоторым аспектам теории опекаемых благ в контексте эффективного и неэффективного равновесия. В работе представлены особенности опекаемых...

We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when...

This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) for continuum economies with widespread externalities (i.e., those over which each individual has negligible control). Externalities need not result directly from trading activities. Neither free...