(strict) Nash networks in the 1-way flow model but a negative impact in the 2-way flow model. In our discussion on possible …

It is commonly assumed that friendship should decrease strategic uncertainty in games involving tacit coordination …. However, this has never been tested on two "opposite poles" of coordination, namely, games of strategic complements and …

. However, this has never been tested on two "opposite poles" of coordination, namely, games of strategic complements and …. Friendship thus appears to have a very different impact on coordination games involving strategic complements and substitutes. We …

Friendship is commonly assumed to reduce strategic uncertainty and enhance tacit coordination. However, this assumption … has never been tested across two opposite poles of coordination involving either strategic complementarity or … substitutability. We had participants interact with friends or strangers in two classic coordination games: the stag hunt game, which …

Successful coordination is key for economic and societal wealth. The rich literature on the minimum-effort game (MEG …) has provided valuable insights into coordination, both theoretically and empirically. Yet, although real-world scenarios … often involve asymmetric benefits and/or costs from coordination, most previous studies rely on symmetric MEGs. We …

, but rather in terms of how to act with any given partner. There is a form of contingent cooperation in one-shot prisoners … fear payoff difference is less than the sum of greed and cooperation payoff differences. The adaptive capabilities just …-players' equilibrium probability of cooperating changes: depending on the relative size of fear, greed, and cooperation payoff differences …

, but rather in terms of how to act with any given partner. There is a form of contingent cooperation in one-shot prisoners … fear payoff difference is less than the sum of greed and cooperation payoff differences. The adaptive capabilities just …-players' equilibrium probability of cooperating changes: depending on the relative size of fear, greed, and cooperation payoff differences …