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We introduce a reciprocity protocol, an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains …-dominant symmetric equilibrium. In it, even self-centered participants show extensive reciprocity to one another. Thus, despite a setting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012387904
We introduce a reciprocity protocol, an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains …-dominant symmetric equilibrium. In it, even self-centered participants show extensive reciprocity to one another. Thus, despite a setting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321308
In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such behavior can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752722
We propose the Point Beauty Contest, a mechanism to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows for nuanced coordination strategies, as subjects can invest in multiple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012153663
We propose a method to identify the ranking of focal points (Schelling, 1960) on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects bet on only one alternative, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows them to invest in multiple alternatives and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011987024
This paper considers an economy with a public good where a decision must be made both about the level of the public good and the taxation imposed on each citizen (multidimensional policy space). In this context, we derive two interesting results: i) we show that a Nash equilibrium exists under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216274
In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343846
In this article we combine Debreu's (1952) social system with Hurwicz's (1994, 2008) ideas of embedding a "desired" game form into a "natural" game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is "illegal" according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499554
We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576714
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in different states. In such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690726