This article investigates rationalizable implementation in social environments where agents can provide hard evidence on the private information they possess. Specifically, we study necessary and sufficient conditions for virtual implementation using a notion of Rationalizability that captures...

We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study...

In this paper, we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple two person fishery management game. Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered. Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic framework has no implications for the...

We present a new approach for studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Distributional Equilibrium (MSDE), prove its existence,...

Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a mapping from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the agents in society. The implementation problem...

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of "complexity"...

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

We investigate implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information concerning the state from epistemological perspectives. While each agent is either selfish or honest, they do not expect other participants to be honest. Nevertheless, an honest agent may exist, not among the...

We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the...