We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We...

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...

Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a mapping from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the agents in society. The implementation problem...

In this paper, we study full implementation problem by mechanisms that allow delay. The delay on the equilibrium path may be zero, infinitesimally small or a fixed positive number. In all these three cases, implementable rules are characterized by a monotonicity-like condition alone, including...

This article investigates rationalizable implementation in social environments where agents can provide hard evidence on the private information they possess. Specifically, we study necessary and sufficient conditions for virtual implementation using a notion of Rationalizability that captures...

We consider the implementation problem under incomplete information and private values. We investigate double implementability of social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria and ex post equilibria. We show that the notion of an ex post equilibrium is weaker than the notion of a...

We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We show that restricted...