In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria basedon Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous—time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier byBrown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently beensuggested as a plausible...

This paper studies Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields where one player has a head start in the form of additional troops on one of the battlefields. Such games arise naturally in marketing, electoral competition, and military conflict. Sion and Wolfe (1957) have shown that, if the...

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as assumed by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form...

The aim of the paper is to compare the sensitivity of a government's fiscal policy and a central bank's monetary policy, which are in Nash equilibrium in the case of a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank in Czechia, Hungary, and Romania. The analysis for each country...

We study equilibria in an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging game, a cost minimization game inherent to decentralized charging control strategy for EV power demand management. In our model, each user optimizes its total cost which is sum of direct power cost and the indirect dissatisfaction cost. We...

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by...

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...

This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik(1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each …rm proposes how muchit is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker alsoproposes which salary she is willing to accept from each …rm if they arematched. The matchmaker...

I exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact ofincentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game-theoretic model is developed thatcaptures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis-à-vis the number of points awardedto a win. The observable...

This paper analyzes the effect of the availability of information about the payoff structure on the behavior of players in a Common-Pool Resource game. Six groups of six individuals played a complete information game, while other six groups played the same game but with no information about the...