Showing 1 - 10 of 1,192
We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672033
within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call preopening. During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380033
In dynamic environments, Q-learning is an adaptative rule that provides an estimate (a Q-value) of the continuation value associated with each alternative. A naive policy consists in always choosing the alternative with highest Q-value. We consider a family of Q-based policy rules that may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014344942
In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012239417