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Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2015

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2017

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764914

Fish Wars: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Approaches

Garnaev, Andrey; Denisova, Elena - In: Czech Economic Review 2 (2008) 1, pp. 028-040

Mirman (1979) and Levhari and Mirman (1980) suggested a simple two person multistage game-theoretical model which sheds some light on the economic implications inherent in the fishing conflicts where the decisions of the competitors have an effect on the evolution of the fish population and so,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698648

Pairwise Comparison Dynamics and Evolutionary Foundations for Nash Equilibrium

Sandholm, William H. - In: Games 1 (2009) 1, pp. 3-17

We introduce a class of evolutionary game dynamics — pairwise comparison dynamics — under which revising agents choose a candidate strategy at random, switching to it with positive probability if and only if its payoff is higher than the agent’s current strategy. We prove that all such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682989

On the Three-Person Game Baccara Banque

Ethier, Stewart N.; Lee, Jiyeon - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 57-78

Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. However, this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011275206

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

The alternating offers game due to Rubinstein (1982) had been used by Binmore (1980) and by Binmore et.al. (1986) to provide via its unique subgame perfect equilibrium an approximate non-cooperative support for the Nash bargaining solution of associated cooperative two-person bargaining games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680

Lampe, Martin von; Deconinck, Koen; Bastien, Véronique - 2016

This report provides a conceptual foundation for the analysis of international regulatory co-operation (IRC) and its potential benefits through reduced trade costs. Different forms of IRC aiming to reduce specification, conformity assessment and information costs - which can arise from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582094

On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game

Duman, Papatya - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000646

Compressed equilibrium in large repeated games of incomplete information

Kalai, Ehud; Shmaya, Eran - 2013

Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352862

Learning to play approximate Nash equilibria in games with many players

Cartwright, Edward - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002340837