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existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642
We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through … are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite … time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050
We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining … positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive … results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games. -- Inner Core ; Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution ; Competitive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009268595
We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining … positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108823
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731672
Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters [lamda] that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003388467
Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317590
Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set a parameters λ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058235