Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A <Subscript>1</Subscript>,A <Subscript>2</Subscript>,…,A <Subscript> n </Subscript>, and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a <Subscript>1</Subscript>,a <Subscript>2</Subscript>,…,a <Subscript> n </Subscript>)...</subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript>

We consider a duopoly market in which two retailers with different reputation compete in prices and one of the retailers is considering selling through a new channel. Consumers are reputation sensitive and averse to the new channel. In addition, the reputation sensitivity and new channel...

We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study...

We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study...