We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching … correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable. -- Matching with couples …

implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for "sub-implementation …" and "sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete …

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching …

Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is …

We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under …

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and … Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts … stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable. -- Matching …