In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...

In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or 'vigilant' parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant†parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we...

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...