We use quantifiers and selection functions to represent simultaneous move games. Quantifiers and selection functions are examples of higher-order functions. A higher order function is a function whose domain is itself a set of functions. Thus, quantifiers and selection func- tions allow players...

We present a multistage stochastic procedure that produces a fair allocation of a cake among n-person. In each step players observe the collection of the random offers (x1, …, xn), where x1 + ⋯ + xn = 1. As the proposal emerged players have to make a decision to accept it or reject it. The...

This paper examines the existence of Berge equilibrium. Colman et al. provide a theorem on the existence of this type of equilibrium in the paper [Colman, A. M., Körner, T. W., Musy, O. and Tazdaït, T. [2011] Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria, J. Math. Psychol. 55,...

The concert queueing problem corresponds to determining the equilibrium arrival profile of non-cooperative customers selecting their arrival times to a queue where the service opens at a specified time. The customers are allowed to arrive before or after this time. This problem has a variety of...

We consider a two player finite state-action general sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both discounted and average cost criteria. We consider the situation where player 1 has subscription-based constraints and player 2, who controls the transition probabilities, has...

We introduce a new zero-sum matrix game for modeling search in structured domains. In this game, one player tries to find a "bug" while the other tries to hide it. Both players exploit the structure of the "search" domain. Intuitively, this search game is a mathematical generalization of the...

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We...

Koray & Yildiz (2018) introduces a new framework for implementation in which the main tool to design is the rights structure introduced by Sertel (2001). It was assumed that there is only one stage to obtain the equilibrium outcome of a rights structure. We formulate implementation via two-stage...

The objective of this work is to analyze how social networks coevolve with other dimensions of agents' choice. We present a model where agents choose their neighbors as well as a mode of behavior in 2 × 2 anti-coordination games, i.e. games where an individual's best response is to behave...

The main objects here are Nash equilibria in spatial Cournot oligopolies when profits depend on coordinated distribution. Production is non-cooperative, but the subsequent transportation must be performed jointly to minimize costs. Cournot-Nash equilibria for this two-stage game with partial...